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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4337
Statutory marketing boards that have exclusive authority 
to purchase domestic production, sell for export, and 
set purchase and sales prices of commodities are a type 
of state trading enterprise that is subject to World Trade 
Organization disciplines. This paper assesses a recent 
dispute brought by the United States against Canada, 
alleging that WTO rules require state trading enterprises 
to operate solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations and that the Canadian government 
did not require the Canadian Wheat Board to do so. 
The panel and Appellate Body found that the primary 
This paper—product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group—is part of a research project on WTO dispute 
settlement. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at bhoekman@worldbank.org.
discipline of the WTO regarding state trading enterprises 
was nondiscrimination, and that operating on the basis 
of “commercial considerations” was not an independent 
obligation. Instead, WTO disciplines regarding the 
pricing behavior of state trading enterprises use a 
“commercial considerations” test as a possible indicator 
of discrimination. Although a significant degree of price 
discrimination is observed in the case of Canadian wheat 
exports, there are economic arguments why this might 
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* This paper is part of an American Law Institute project on Principles of World Trade Law led 
by Henrik Horn and Petros Mavroidis. We are grateful to very helpful comments by Frieder 
Roessler.  The views expressed are personal and should not be attributed to the World Bank. 1.  Introduction 
State trading enterprises (STEs) commonly take the form of statutory marketing boards 
that have exclusive authority to purchase domestic production, to sell for export, and to 
set purchase and sales prices.  They may also capture economies of scale, reducing 
marketing and other transaction costs for producers (see Secretariat, WTO, 1995). In the 
Canada-Wheat case that is the focus of this paper,
1 the U.S. challenged several Canadian 
measures affecting the purchase and sale of wheat. The main feature of the complaint that 
we will focus on concerned the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) export regime for wheat.  
The statutory objective of the CWB is to market certain grain grown in Canada in 
an “orderly manner” in inter-provincial and export trade. The CWB is granted exclusive 
authority over the sale in export markets and for human consumption in the domestic 
market of wheat and barley grown in a “designated area.” The "designated area" includes 
the Canadian provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the Peace River area of 
the province of British Columbia.
2  Thus, the CWB is a monopolist for sales on the 
domestic and export markets, and a monopsonist for Canadian producers of wheat and 
barley that operate in the designated area.  Exclusive control over both export and 
domestic sales makes the CWB a so-called “single desk” STE. 
The U.S. asserted, inter alia, that the CWB export regime was inconsistent with 
Canada's obligations under Article XVII:1 of GATT 1994.  The U.S. argued that the 
following three elements, in combination, violated Article XVII:1:  (a) the legal 
framework of the CWB; (b) Canada's provision to the CWB of exclusive and special 
privileges; and (c) the actions of Canada and the CWB with respect to the CWB's 
purchases and sales involving wheat exports.
3  That is, these three measures 
“collectively” constituted the measure challenged:  the “CWB Export Regime.”   
More particularly, the exclusive and special privileges at issue (referred to in item 
(b) above) were the following: 
(i) the exclusive right to purchase and sell Western Canadian wheat for 
export and domestic human consumption; 
                                                 
1  Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported 
Grain, WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 27 September 2004. 
2    Canadian Notification to the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises of the WTO, G/STR/N/4/CAN.   
3   Panel Report, para. 6.12.  
(ii) the right to set, subject to government approval, the initial price 
payable for Western Canadian wheat destined for export or domestic 
human consumption; 
(iii) the government guarantee of the initial payment to producers of 
Western Canadian wheat; 
(iv) the government guarantee of the CWB's borrowing; and 
(v) government guarantees of certain CWB credit sales to foreign buyers.
 4
The U.S. argued that the CWB Export Regime led the CWB to violate Article 
XVII:1(a) and (b) of GATT.  The U.S. challenged the CWB Export Regime as a whole, 
rather than any individual element.
5  This was understood by the Panel as a “per se” 
challenge to the CWB Export Regime, rather than a challenge to a particular action.
 6   
The U.S. claim rested on four broad assertions.  First, the privileges enjoyed by 
the CWB gave it more flexibility with respect to pricing and other sales terms than a 
commercial actor.  This included the ability to pay wheat producers prices below the 
market price.  Second, this flexibility allowed the CWB to offer non-commercial sales 
terms, denying commercial firms an opportunity to compete.  Third, the structure of the 
CWB induced it to maximize sales, or revenues, rather than profits.  Fourth, the Canadian 
government did not take steps to cause the CWB to comply with Article XVII:1.
7   
The substance of the U.S. claim was that “the CWB statute does not require the 
CWB to sell its wheat for export in accordance with commercial considerations, and the 
CWB maintains the secrecy of its transaction-specific sales practices.  Moreover, . . . the 
exclusive and special privileges enjoyed by the CWB detach the CWB from the 
economic considerations that would govern the conduct of commercial actors engaged in 
the purchase and sale of wheat.”
8  Thus, the main concern of the U.S. was structural:  the 
issue was a perception that the CWB is structured in a way that ensures that it will not act, 
                                                 
4   Panel Report, para. 6.15. See Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development, Canadian Wheat Board 
Government Guarantees for a description of the three guarantees. Available at 
http://www.choicematters.gov.ab.ca. 
5   Panel Report, para. 6.26.   
6   Panel Report, para. 6.28.   
7   Panel Report, paras. 6110-6114.   
8   First Written Submission of the United States of America, Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of 
Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, WT/DS276, August 1, 2003, para. 20.   
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or at least does not ensure that it will act, “solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations.” 
Although Canada lost at the panel stage on certain GATT Article III:4 grounds, 
Canada mounted a successful defense in connection with claims regarding the CWB’s 
behavior as an STE at the panel stage:  the Panel found that the U.S. had failed to 
establish that Canada had violated Article XVII:1(a) or (b).
9  The United States' appeal 
addressed the panel's interpretation of subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1, and the Panel's 
application of this interpretation to the CWB export regime.  Canada's appeal argued that 
the Panel inappropriately failed to address the relationship between subparagraph (a) and 
subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1, and erroneously assumed that a breach of 
subparagraph (b) is sufficient to establish a breach of Article XVII:1. 
The WTO Appellate Body delimited the scope of disciplines applicable to state 
trading enterprises (STEs) under WTO law, adopting an interpretation of Article XVII:1 
of GATT that limits its disciplines to only anti-discrimination.  The Appellate Body 
declined to find broader disciplines requiring STEs to operate “solely in accordance with 
commercial considerations” as an independent requirement.  By doing so, the Appellate 
Body limited the disciplines applicable to STEs to those that would apply to government 
regulation of private entities.  It declined to find a broader requirement that STEs act like 
private persons, and therefore preserved the possibility that states may use STEs to 
achieve broader public policy goals.  It found that Article XVII:1 does not impose 
competition law type obligations on STEs.   
The WTO proceeding discussed in this paper is only a part of a larger conflict 
between Canada and the U.S. over wheat. In a series of domestic investigations, U.S. 
authorities determined that Canadian wheat was being subsidized and dumped in the U.S., 
and was therefore subject to countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties.  However, 
certain of these determinations were appealed to a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel, which 
overturned the findings.
10  Thus, the attack under Article XVII might have been viewed 
                                                 
9   Panel Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, 
WT/DS276/R, adopted 27 September 2004, upheld by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 
6.151 and 7.4(a). 
10   NAFTA Article 1904 Panel Review, In the Matter of Hard Red Spring Wheat from Canada, No. USA-
CDA-2003-1904-06 (June 7, 2005; Dec. 12, 2005. 
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as a less attractive alternative compared to these other previously frustrated routes of 
attack.   
 
2.  State Trading Enterprises and WTO Rules  
STEs are used by governments as instruments of regulation.  They may be used to 
achieve a variety of public policy goals in industrial policy, including in relation to the 
control of imports and exports.  As tools of state intervention in the market, STEs may 
distort competition, and may be inconsistent with liberalization.  But of course, this alone 
does not make them inconsistent with WTO law or policy.   
However, it is possible that STEs may be used to circumvent certain WTO 
commitments with respect to market access and subsidies.
11  They might do so in a 
number of ways.  First, they could circumvent the MFN principle of GATT Article I by 
discriminating among trading partners in their decisions regarding purchase and sale.  
Second, they could circumvent the national treatment principle of GATT Article III by 
discriminating between domestic and imported goods in their decisions regarding 
purchases.  Third, if they hold exclusive import privileges, they could effectively restrict 
quantities of imports, inconsistently with the principles of Article XI of GATT.  Fourth, 
they might exercise exclusive import rights to sell domestically at mark-ups that operate 
similarly to tariffs, but that exceed bound tariffs.  Fifth, STEs may use their purchases 
and sales to subsidize sellers or buyers (Hoekman & Low, 1998). Much of the possibility 
for circumvention of WTO commitments is based on the possibility that STE decision-
making may be opaque, rendering it difficult to determine whether they discriminate or 
confer subsidies (Hoekman & Low, 1998; see also Petersmann, 1998). It is often difficult 
to evaluate whether their prices are subsidized (see Horlick & Mowry, 1998). 
During the GATT period, prior to 1995, STEs did not play a major role in trade 
negotiations, largely because the main sectors and countries in which STEs are active—
agriculture, services, and centrally-planned economies—were effectively excluded from 
GATT disciplines (Hoekman & Low, 1998) STEs declined in importance with the 
growth of the Washington Consensus, and related moves toward reduced state 
                                                 
11   The Appellate Body has termed Article XVII:1(a) an “anti-circumvention” provision.  Appellate Body 
Report, para. 85.   
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intervention in the economy.  In agriculture, for example, the New Zealand Dairy Board 
and the Australian Wheat Board have been transformed into grower cooperatives that do 
not receive government support (Young, 2005), while many of the marketing boards that 
were used by developing country governments to set producer prices and control exports 
have been dismantled.  
The Uruguay Round did not produce additional substantive regulation of STEs.  
The U.S. has advocated additional disciplines on STEs, including prohibitions on 
monopoly rights of STEs (USDA, 2002).  Specifically, the U.S. proposed the following 
disciplines: 
1. Members shall not restrict the right of any interested entity to export, or 
to purchase for export, agricultural products. 
2. No special financing privileges, including government grants, loans, 
loan guarantees, or underwriting of operational costs, shall be granted to state 
trading enterprises that export for sale, directly or indirectly, a significant share of 
the respective Member’s total exports of an agricultural product. 
3. Any Member that establishes, or maintains, for agricultural products, an 
export state trading enterprise shall give notice in writing, at least annually, to the 
Committee on Agriculture, of relevant information, including: initial and 
subsequent acquisition costs incurred and export prices of products exported or 
sold for export by such enterprises on a transaction-specific basis. Any Member 
may request the Member maintaining an export state trading enterprise for 
agriculture to provide specific information concerning all operations relevant to 
the export of agricultural products, as described above. 
The U.S.’ greatest concern has been the CWB, which competes with U.S. firms in 
world wheat markets, as well as in the U.S. (Abbott & Young
 , 2003).  However, with the 
entry of China into the WTO, and the expected entry of Russia, there is clearly a more 
general interest to ensure that STEs are not used to undercut market access and 
subsidization commitments.   
 
3.  Economic Dimensions 
The conflict that gave rise to the present case essentially revolves around competition for 
third markets, as both countries are major producers of wheat and large net exporters. 
Whereas Canada uses the CWB as the conduit for its exports of wheat, the U.S. relies on 
a small number of large private firms to market wheat on export markets. Prior to the 
Uruguay Round (1995) U.S. producers could benefit from export subsidies – through the 
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U.S. Export Enhancement Program. One result of the Uruguay Round was to impose 
disciplines on export subsidy policies. A corollary was that U.S. and other producers in 
countries that had benefited from export subsidies perceived an “unfair” asymmetry to 
have emerged: they had become subject to disciplines, whereas countries with state-
trading agencies might be able to continue to price discriminate across markets and 
effectively subsidize exports.  
From an economic perspective the relevant questions are whether (i) STEs such as 
the CWB do indeed engage in price discrimination on export markets; and (ii) this is a 
reflection of de facto export subsidization made possible by the way the CWB is 
structured and operates.
12   
A legal issue that arises insofar as the CWB can be argued to engage in 
subsidization of exports is to what extent such behavior is (can be) disciplined through 
other WTO provisions, e.g., the Agreement on Agriculture disciplines. Article XVII 
WTO does not deal with de jure subsidization – this is (must be) addressed through 
export subsidy disciplines. However, if STE behavior results in de facto subsidization 
because of discriminatory pricing behavior and exploitation of market power, Article 
XVII may be violated.  While other WTO provisions apply, and might be violated by the 
same behavior, Article XVII may provide a more effective means by which to discipline 
this behavior.   Furthermore, to the extent that the economic “subsidization” would not 
qualify as legal “subsidization” because it involves a benefit being required to be 
provided by private Canadian producers to the CWB, rather than a benefit being provided 
by government, no WTO subsidies disciplines would apply.   
Thus, the reason for the U.S. concern with the structure of the CWB in this case 
seems to have been the risk of implicit subsidization in the economic sense if not in the 
WTO legal sense.  Single desk status potentially gives the CWB the economic power to 
                                                 
12 I.e., the observed discrimination would not also be pursued by a profit maximizing private firm. Note that 
the focus in this paper is on exporting STEs, not importing STEs. In practice, STEs in net importers may 
circumvent negotiated market access commitments through their behavior. This became more important 
post-Uruguay Round due to the shift to tariffication of agricultural protection and the use of tariff rate 
quotas (TRQs) to guarantee minimum access to highly protected markets. These TRQs require 
management (allocation mechanisms), something that may be done by STEs. Article XVII arguably is 
primarily focused on this type of issue: a complement to other GATT articles that aim to preclude use of 
alternative instruments to restrict access more than what has been negotiated through tariff bindings. While 
the U.S. did contest import-related issues, it did not appeal any of the Panel findings in this area. 
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price discriminate or to cross-subsidize between domestic and foreign markets. However, 
such price discrimination may reflect market factors (demand conditions in different 
markets) and differences in product composition (quality) as well as the monopolist-cum-
monopsonist status of the CWB.  
The CWB engages in a number of practices that may allow it to reduce prices on 
export markets below what competitors can charge in the absence of export subsidies. 
One of these is a two-part payment system under which farmers obtain only partial 
payment for their crops when delivered to the CWB. This first payment is determined by 
a minimum price for farmers, guaranteed by the government. It is supplemented by a 
final payment once output has been sold on export markets and selling expenses, 
overhead etc. have been netted out. The CWB also engages in price pooling: domestic 
producers are paid the average price (net of costs) obtained for a specific quality/variety 
of wheat and barley on the domestic and all export markets.  
The combination of price pooling and two-part payment scheme may result in the 
CWB being able to price below competitors by credibly lowering the costs of the output 
that is exported (i.e., low initial payments could be used as a credible pre-commitment 
device in an export competition game) and/or through cross-subsidization by “pricing to 
market” – insofar as this entails losses on some export markets this can be compensated 
by higher prices on other markets. The two-part pricing scheme may in effect imply that 
the CWB is being given a short-term “loan” by Canadian farmers, as they must accept the 
minimum, initial, average price offered by the CWB. In addition, the CWB benefits from 
government guarantees of both its debt and certain credits it may grant its foreign 
buyers.
13  
As a result of its exclusivity rights, the CWB can engage in a variety of strategies. 
Which strategy it will pursue will depend on the underlying objectives it has been 
assigned. As a government entity, the objective of the CWB is not necessarily profit 
maximization. Indeed, a rationale for the creation and operation of STEs generally 
includes equity as well as efficiency objectives.  In the field of agriculture, STEs can 
serve important public policy purposes, such as price support or stabilization, 
                                                 
13 In principle, government loan guarantees and credits that are conditional on exports would be covered by 
the Agreement on Agriculture and the SCM Agreement. 
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internalization of externalities (quality and associated reputational benefits for the 
country as a whole), and income redistribution.  Thus, in addition to exploitation of 
national market power by aggregating the supplies of many small farmers (economies of 
scale, etc.), STEs often act to redistribute income towards -- or more frequently, away 
from -- farmers. The latter objective has often been important in developing countries, 
where governments seek to use low producer prices as a means of transferring resources 
to consumers of food in urban areas or to support investments elsewhere in the economy. 
Knowing what the underlying national objectives are is clearly important from the 
perspective of national welfare and the evaluation/design of policy. However, what the 
objectives are is not always relevant from a WTO perspective, as its focus may be only 
on the question whether the trade impacts of a policy result in discrimination that goes 
beyond what a country may impose given its commitments in the WTO. As a result, 
WTO rules in this area, as in others, may result in incentives for countries to use less 
efficient instruments to pursue a given objective. In the case of STEs, for example, if the 
underlying objective is to raise exports, explicit export subsidies may be the more 
efficient (and transparent) instrument. For example, simple economic theory suggests that 
for a given target increase in domestic production, the use of export subsidies will 
generate lower welfare costs for the imposing country than an STE that uses price 
pooling as a way of raising average prices for farmers (see Alston & Gray, 2000).
14
Canada is a major wheat exporter. Thus, it has some market power on the world 
market. In this connection it is important to recognize that Canadian wheat is a 
differentiated product. For a given type of wheat, it is of more uniform and of higher 
average quality than U.S. wheat. In part this is because of the operation of the CWB, 
which sets minimum standards and specifies the type of seeds that may be used for a 
given quality/type of wheat or barley that is to be procured and exported.  
The empirical literature on the global wheat market suggests that this may be best 
characterized as a quantity-setting oligopoly. In the case of barley, price setting does not 
                                                 
14 Important questions for domestic policy and assessing the costs and benefits of alternative instruments 
are the size of the excess burden of taxation needed to finance export subsidies and administrative costs 
(transfer efficiency), the incidence of the “tax” that is used to generate a given transfer to farmers – 
taxpayers in the case of export subsidies, consumers in the case of STEs, whether the STE is being used as 
a mechanism to ensure that a greater share of profits accrue to farmers instead of middlemen/traders (the 
concentration ratio of wholesalers/distributors in the U.S. is over 75% for example), etc. In this paper we 
abstract from these types of domestic policy questions. 
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appear to be supported by the data – STEs and other suppliers do not have market 
leadership and can be characterized as engaging in Cournot competition. In the case of 
wheat, the CWB engages in price discrimination, but much if not most of this reportedly 
reflects the fact that there are significant quality differences among types of wheat 
exported to different markets.
15 Moreover, research suggests that the CWB does not set 
initial prices to farmers optimally from a profit maximization/rent shifting perspective. 
Prices paid to farmers are “too high”: producers receive a higher average price than they 
should if the CWB was seeking to maximize profits. This suggests either that strategic 
motivations do not drive pricing decisions, that regulation and other oversight of the 
CWB ensures that interests of farmers dominate, or that because of the nature of the 
differentiated products it makes more sense to focus on measures to improve quality and 
exploit quality differences (Lavoie, 2005 and Dong, Marsh & Stiegert, 2006).
16 In 
practice it appears that the CWB obtains a premium price for many of its exports, rather 
than selling output at “subsidized” levels, reflecting the higher quality/differentiated 
nature of its exports (Lavoie, 2005 and Sumner & Boltuck, 2004).
 
As discussed further below, what matters from the perspective of the WTO 
(Article XVII) is whether any observed price discrimination across foreign markets or 
between domestic and foreign markets would also be pursued by a private firm (such as 
cooperative of farmers). Independent of the specific features of the CWB – such as price 
pooling – the evidence of extensive product differentiation in the wheat market suggests 
that private firms would also pursue price discrimination strategies in markets where they 
have (some) pricing power. That in turn suggests that in practice it is difficult to establish 
a private “commercial” counterfactual where discrimination would not be optimal.  
 
4.  The Disciplines of Article XVII 
Article XVII:1 of GATT applies to STEs and provides as follows: 
                                                 
15  See Lavoie, 2005 and Dong, Marsh & Stiegert, 2006, for recent empirical analyses of the operation of 
the CWB in wheat and barley markets, respectively. These papers also contain extensive references to the 
economic literature on STEs in general and the CWB in particular. 
16 Note that insofar as average total prices paid to Canadian producers are not suppressed so as to maximize 
the profits of the CWB, this may have the effect of increasing total output, enhancing competition on world 
markets. The same outcome may result from price pooling (paying farmers the average price obtained 
across all markets). 
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1.*
17 ( a)  Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a 
State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, 
exclusive or special privileges,* such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving 
either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-
discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures 
affecting imports or exports by private traders. 
 
 ( b)  The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood 
to require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this 
Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations,* including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and 
other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other 
contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, 
to compete for participation in such purchases or sales. 
 
4.1 Scope of Application of Article XVII:1 
GATT does not define STEs.  The Uruguay Round Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the 
"Understanding") provides a working definition for STEs, to be used to determine the 
scope of the obligation of notification specified in the Understanding: 
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which 
have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or 
constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or 
sales the level or direction of imports or exports. 
 
Importantly, the essence of this definition is first, that there are exclusive or 
special privileges, and second, that in the exercise of these powers, the STE influences 
through purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.   
However, the definition contained in the Understanding is narrower than the 
scope of application of Article XVII:1.  The Appellate Body cited the Panel’s statement 
that “Like the parties, the Panel uses the term ‘STE’ or ‘state trading enterprise’ to refer 
to both types of enterprises covered by Article XVII:1, i.e., State enterprises or 
enterprises that have formally or in effect been granted exclusive or special privileges.”
18  
                                                 
17   Asterisks refer to “ad notes” that form part of the GATT.  For example, and as relevant to this case, the 
ad note to Article XVII:1 provides, inter alia, that “The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for 
its sales of a product in different markets is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, provided that 
such different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in 
export markets.”   
18   Appellate Body Report, para. 114, citing Panel Report, para. 6.33. 
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In the present case, there was no dispute as to whether the CWB is an STE, as 
Canada had notified the CWB as an STE.
19
 
4.2 Discrimination and Commercial Considerations 
In the Canada Wheat case, Canada argued that the Panel erred “in not considering 
the ‘proper’ relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 of the 
GATT 1994 and in proceeding to examine the consistency of the CWB Export Regime 
with Article XVII:1(b) without first having found a breach of Article XVII:1(a).”
20  
According to Canada, because the Panel made this error, it also erred by failing to make a 
finding of discriminatory conduct under subparagraph (a) before examining the 
“commerciality” of the CWB Export Regime under subparagraph (b).   
The United States’ appeal related to “the Panel’s interpretation of subparagraph 
(b) of Article XVII:1; to the Panel’s application of this interpretation to the CWB Export 
Regime; and to the Panel’s ultimate finding that the United States had not established any 
inconsistency with the principles of subparagraphs (a) or (b) of Article XVII:1 of the 
GATT 1994.”
21  The U.S. sought a finding of broad disciplines on the behavior of STEs, 
including their competitive behavior.  The U.S. argued that Article XVII:1(b) establishes 
an independent obligation for STEs to base their decisions on commercial considerations.  
The U.S. argued that subparagraphs (a) and (b) contain “multiple, distinct obligations.”
22  
The Appellate Body began its consideration of Article XVII:1 by examining the 
relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b): between references to a finding of 
discrimination and a finding of failure to purchase and sell “solely in accordance with 
commercial considerations.”    
The U.S. argued that its position was supported by statements of the panel in 
Korea-Various Measures on Beef, suggesting that the obligations expressed in 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) are independent: 
A conclusion that the principle of non-discrimination was violated would suffice to prove 
a violation of Article XVII; similarly, a conclusion that a decision to purchase or buy was 
                                                 
19   Panel Report, para. 6.108.  See Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, New and Full Notification 
[by Canada] Pursuant to Article XVII:4(A) of the GATT and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XVII, G/STR/N/4/CAN, 5 November 2002.   
20   Appellate Body Report, para. 76.   
21   Appellate Body Report, para. 77 (emphasis in original)(citation omitted).   
22   U.S. Appellee’s Submission, para. 5. 
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Canada, on the other hand, argued that the above statement by the panel in the 
Korea-Various Measures on Beef case was not necessary to the panel's decision.  
Moreover, the panel in Korea—Various Measures on Beef expressly endorsed the views 
of the panel in Canada – FIRA, which read subparagraphs (a) and (b) as one obligation.
 24  
The panel in Canada-FIRA stated that “[t]he fact that sub-paragraph (b) does not 
establish a separate general obligation to allow enterprises to act in accordance with 
commercial considerations, but merely defines the obligations set out in the preceding 
sub-paragraph, is made clear through the introductory words . . . .”
25   
In accord with the panel in Canada—FIRA, the panel in Korea—Various 
Measures on Beef stated that the scope of paragraph (b) defines the obligations in 
paragraph (a):  evidence as to whether the STE action is based on commercial 
considerations is to be used to assess discrimination.
 26  This would seem to confirm the 
Canadian argument, and the Appellate Body found that it was “not clear that the panel in 
Korea—Various Measures on Beef intended [the language quoted above] to have the 
meaning the United States seeks to ascribe to it.”
27  Indeed there is much language in the 
Korea—Various Measures on Beef decision to support the Canadian position.   
The Appellate Body found that the “shall be understood” language in 
subparagraph (b), referring to subparagraph (a), means that subparagraph (b) is dependent 
upon, and an explanation of, subparagraph (a).
28  Here the Appellate Body followed the 
reasoning of the Panel in the Canada—FIRA case.
29  Subparagraph (b) clarifies the 
general obligation of non-discrimination provided in subparagraph (a).  Subparagraph (b) 
does not establish requirements independent of subparagraph (a).
30   
                                                 
23   Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161,169/R, 31 July 
2000, para. 757.  
24   Panel Report, para. 6.56. 
25   Report of the Panel, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, adopted 7 February 
1984, para 5.16, L/5504, 30S/140. 
26   Panel Report on Korea - Various Measures on Beef, para. 755.  
27   Appellate Body Report, para. 103.   
28  Appellate Body Report, paras. 89-91; 100.   
29   Canada—Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, L504, adopted 7 February 1984, 
30S/140. 
30   Appellate Body Report, para. 100. 
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Therefore, in future cases under Article XVII:1, a panel will need to begin its 
analysis with an evaluation of the application of subparagraph (a).  “It appears to us that 
these [the subparagraph (b)] types of differential treatment would be the most likely to 
occur in practice and, therefore, that most if not all cases under Article XVII:1 will 
involve an analysis of both subparagraphs (a) and (b).”
31   Canada argued that a panel 
must first find discrimination under subparagraph (a) before it can go on to make findings 
under subparagraph (b), and that subparagraph (b) does not create independent 
obligations.
32  Rather, “[i]n Canada's view, what subparagraph (b) does is to interpret and 
temper the obligation under subparagraph (a).”
33
While the Appellate Body did not find that a full analysis under subparagraph (a) 
is required before proceeding to subparagraph (b), it found that a panel must at least 
identify the differential treatment alleged to be discriminatory under subparagraph (a) 
before performing its analysis under subparagraph (b).
 34  The Appellate Body found that 
an evaluation of whether discrimination is based on commercial considerations within the 
meaning of subparagraph (b) might depend on the type of discrimination identified under 
subparagraph (a).
35  The Appellate Body stated that “[s]ubparagraph (b) sets forth two 
specific conditions with which an STE must comply if allegedly discriminatory conduct 
falling, prima facie, within the scope of subparagraph (a) is to be found consistent with 
Article XVII:1.”
36  Thus, as suggested by Canada, subparagraph (b) can serve to 
“temper” or limit the scope of subparagraph (a):  not all discrimination within the 
meaning of subparagraph (a) violates Article XVII:1.   
The panel in Korea-Various Measures on Beef had said that the variables in 
subparagraph (b) are to be used to assess whether the national measure is 
discriminatory.
37  The Appellate Body in the present case stated that it did not decide 
whether a panel may find a violation of subparagraph (a) alone, without considering 
subparagraph (b).
38  
                                                 
31   Appellate Body Report, para. 99. 
32   Panel Report, para. 6.54.   
33   Id.  
34   Appellate Body Report, paras. 111-112.   
35   Appellate Body Report, para. 110. 
36   Id.   
37   Korea—Various Measures on Beef, para. 757. 
38   Appellate Body Report, at para. 106, note 115. 
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The Panel had reserved on its analysis of subparagraph (a), subject to its 
determination under subparagraph (b).  Under these circumstances, the Appellate Body 
found that the Panel’s inquiry under subparagraph (b) was made in the context of an 
inquiry into alleged discriminatory practices, and therefore the Panel did not misapply 
these two provisions by focusing its analysis on subparagraph (b).
39   That is, given that 
the Panel found no non-commercial sales within the meaning of subparagraph (b), and 
the U.S. did not establish an independent claim of discrimination under subparagraph (a), 
there was no error. 
The logic advanced by the Appellate Body is not ineluctable.  The “shall be 
understood” language could equally be understood to deem failure to “make purchases or 
sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations” to constitute “discrimination” 
under subparagraph (a), reversing the order of analysis.  The U.S. alleged pursuant to 
Article XVII:1 that Canada engaged in discrimination by virtue of its alleged non-
commercial sales.
40 Indeed, the U.S. argued that “on the facts of this case, the alleged 
discriminatory sales behaviour by the CWB is a necessary result of the CWB not making 
sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations.”
41  
Furthermore, all discrimination in the sense of subparagraph (a) (in the WTO 
sense) would be expected to involve decisions based on non-commercial considerations.  
Discrimination in the WTO sense involves government (policy) measures that distinguish 
between goods in a way that a private person, absent the policy, would not.  
Discrimination in this context is the use of impermissible considerations in choosing 
suppliers or customers:
42 commercial considerations are always permissible under WTO 
law. Moreover, in practice it will frequently be difficult, if not impossible, to objectively 
determine whether or not a specific transaction is based on commercial considerations, as 
pricing and allocation decisions tend to be multidimensional and may reflect 
factors/strategies that are not known or observable to outsiders. 
Thus, it seems logically impossible for subparagraph (b) to narrow the scope of 
subparagraph (a).  Although the Appellate Body suggests that measures that comply with 
                                                 
39   Appellate Body Report, paras. 119-123.   
40   Appellate Body Report, para. 118.   
41   Panel Report, para. 6.58.  
42   See Panel Report, para. 6.88. 
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the two prongs of subparagraph (b)—commercial considerations and opportunities to 
enterprises of other WTO members—might escape the disciplines of subparagraph (a),
43 
this understanding seems to lack textual support and it is difficult to see how it would 
apply.  
 
4.3 Commercial Considerations 
The U.S. argued that “[w]here an export STE has been granted special and 
exclusive privileges which permit it to operate without the normal market constraints 
faced by a commercial actor, that STE could make use of its privileges to gain market 
share in particular markets, but such behaviour would not be commercial.”
44  Under this 
reading, the prohibition of non-commercial considerations could have a scope that goes 
beyond discrimination:  it would not necessarily be discriminatory to seek to maximize 
market share, but it would, according to the U.S., be “non-commercial.”  However, there 
seems little reason to believe that a requirement of commercial considerations excludes a 
goal of increasing market share.
45   
The Appellate Body confirmed the Panel’s understanding of the term 
“commercial considerations:” 
The Panel began its analysis by considering the meaning of the term "commercial 
considerations" in subparagraph (b) and found that this term should be understood as 
meaning "considerations pertaining to commerce and trade, or considerations which 
involve regarding purchases or sales ‘as mere matters of business’." The Panel also 
determined that the requirement that STEs act solely in accordance with such 
considerations "must imply that they should seek to purchase or sell on terms which are 
economically advantageous for themselves and/or their owners, members, beneficiaries, 
etc."  Thus, the Panel interpreted the term "commercial considerations" as encompassing 
a range of different considerations that are defined in any given case by the type of 
"business" involved (purchases or sales), and by the economic considerations that 
motivate actors engaged in business in the relevant market(s).
46
 
Thus, there is no a priori reason to exclude concerns for market share, as opposed 
to profits.  The Appellate Body’s understanding of the relationship between 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) informed its interpretation of subparagraph (b).  Subparagraph 
                                                 
43   Appellate Body Report, para. 110. 
44   Panel Report, para. 6.74. 
45   The types of actions taken to gain market share would be likely to involve price discrimination among 
export markets.  However, the ad note to Article XVII stipulates that price discrimination is permitted, so 
long as it is motivated by commercial considerations. 
46   Appellate Body Report, para. 140, 144 (citations omitted). 
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(b) does not address all failures to act in a commercial manner, but only those related to 
discrimination.  The Appellate Body pointed out that “Article XVII:1 imposes an 
obligation on Members not to use STEs in order to discriminate in ways that would be 
prohibited if undertaken directly by Members.”
47   
 
4.4 Competition and STE Behavior 
The central question addressed in this case by the Appellate Body was whether 
the non-discriminatory treatment prong of (a) is independent of the commercial 
considerations prong of subparagraph (b).  The U.S. argued that these were independent, 
several obligations, either of which could be the basis for a successful attack.  The 
Appellate Body concluded that subparagraph (b) clarifies the scope of the non-
discrimination obligation in subparagraph (a).  According to the Appellate Body, the 
types of discrimination listed in subparagraph (b) are the most likely, but do not exhaust 
the category of measures that might violate subparagraph (a).
48  Therefore, panels must 
begin by analyzing subparagraph (a), and will usually, but not always, also have to 
evaluate subparagraph (b).
49  
The Appellate Body stated that “[t]he disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at 
preventing certain types of discriminatory behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting 
that provision as imposing comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs, as 
the United States would have us do.”
 50  Thus, subparagraph (b) does not establish 
separate requirements independent of subparagraph (a).
51  The Appellate Body quoted 
approvingly the Canada-FIRA panel report to the effect that subparagraph (b) does not 
establish a separate obligation to act in accordance with commercial considerations.
52  
  Importantly, Article XVII is therefore not a broad-ranging requirement that STEs 
emulate private sector behavior.  Rather, STEs may engage in actions that are not 
commercially motivated—that reflect public policy objectives—so long as the 
implementation of that public policy is not discriminatory.  In other words, STEs may act 
                                                 
47   Appellate Body Report, para. 98. 
48   Appellate Body Report, para. 99. 
49   Appellate Body Report, para. 109.   
50   Appellate Body Report, para. 145.   
51   Appellate Body Report, para. 100. 
52   Appellate Body Report, para. 104.  See Canada—Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, 
L504, adopted 7 February 1984, 30S/140, para. 5.16. 
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as agents of public policy, so long as they comply with the non-discrimination 
requirements of Article XVII.  The Panel articulated this concept:  “Finally, the United 
States' argument that STEs must act like ‘commercial actors’ tends to overlook the fact 
that STEs are not necessarily used only for commercial purposes. STEs may also be 
established or maintained to carry out governmental policies or programmes (e.g., 
policies related to food security, policies aimed at reducing alcohol consumption, policies 
to achieve price stabilization, etc.).”
53  
  The U.S. also argued that the second clause of subparagraph (b) of Article 
XVII:1—requiring STEs to “afford the enterprises of other Members adequate 
opportunity . . . to compete for participation in such purchases or sales”—requires that 
adequate opportunities be afforded to enterprises that wished to sell in competition with 
the STE.
54  However, the Appellate body found that the term “such purchases or sales” 
refers back to subparagraph (a), which addresses purchases and sales by the STE, not by 
competing enterprises.  Thus, the requisite adequate opportunity is to be a purchaser or 
seller counterpart to the STE, not to be a competitor to the STE.
55
The Appellate Body’s understanding has important substantive ramifications.  
There is no independent obligation of decision-making in accordance with commercial 
considerations.  Subparagraph (b) is neither a source of independent obligations, nor a 
basis for finding a deemed violation of subparagraph (a).  Paragraph 145 of the Appellate 
Body Report is worth quoting in full: 
At the same time, our interpretation of the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) 
of Article XVII:1 necessarily implies that the scope of the inquiry to be undertaken under 
subparagraph (b) must be governed by the principles of subparagraph (a). In other words, 
a panel inquiring whether an STE has acted solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations must undertake this inquiry with respect to the market(s) in which the STE 
is alleged to be engaging in discriminatory conduct. Subparagraph (b) does not give 
panels a mandate to engage in a broader inquiry into whether, in the abstract, STEs are 
acting "commercially". The disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at preventing certain 
types of discriminatory behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting that provision as 
imposing comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs, as the United States 
would have us do. (citation omitted)   
  The U.S. argument in this case can be linked to the broader argument regarding 
the role of competition policy in international trade.  In a sense, a single desk STE is 
                                                 
53   Panel Report, para. 6.96 (citation omitted). 
54   Appellate Body Report, para. 152. 
55   Appellate Body Report, para. 157. 
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similar to a private domestic monopolist (See McCorriston & MacLaren, 2002). A private 
domestic monopolist would have the power to price discriminate and to cross-subsidize, 
but would lack the interest that a STE might have in providing a net subsidy.  So, 
assuming for a moment that the extent of STE net subsidization could be identified and 
addressed through WTO subsidies law, the other concerns are similar.   
  In the debate regarding competition policy at the WTO, proponents argue that 
states have incentives to externalize anticompetitive effects on one another through lax 
enforcement of competition law when the adverse effects occur abroad (See Guzman, 
2001 and 2004). The STE context is more direct.  States are not simply failing to have or 
enforce competition law:  they are directly establishing monopolies.  Indeed, Sir Leon 
Brittan has opined as follows:   
I should at this point raise a related issue concerning state trading, in other words, where 
a government has a special right to a designated corporation to import or export or to 
distribute certain goods . . . .  I think that, if we are to look at international competition 
rules seriously, the time is ripe to consider whether this antiquated form of monopoly 
trading can be phased out altogether (1997). 
 
That said, there is an important difference between the domain of competition 
policy, especially if defined in U.S. terms as antitrust law and enforcement, and STEs. 
The latter are mandated by governments, as are any other entities with exclusive rights 
and privileges. In practice, competition law often does not apply to the domestic actions 
of government-supported or mandated entities because their actions reflect government 
policy. The implication is that this is a debate that must extend to what falls under Article 
86 of the EC Treaty (formerly Article 90 Treaty of Rome): exclusive rights and State 
monopolies.  Finally, it is worth noting that certain types of government policies – 
including STEs – may be appropriate responses to the exercise of market power by large 
multinational corporations in particular fields. “The assumption of a competitive 
alternative inevitably leads to the conclusion that elimination of STEs would lead to 
improved market performance” (See Paddock, 1998). In addition to questions regarding 
the assumption of perfect competition, it should also be borne in mind that STEs may 
maximize total producer surplus rather than profits (McCorriston & MacLaren, 2002). 
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4.5 Article XVII and Article III 
There has been some dispute as to whether Article XVII:1 includes a prohibition 
of discrimination in the national treatment sense (the Article III sense), in addition to a 
prohibition of discrimination in the MFN sense (Petersmann, 1998). The Panel in 
Canada-FIRA suggested in dictum that it did not.
56  In the Korea—Various Measures on 
Beef decision, the Panel held that the principles referenced in Article XVII:1(a) include at 
least the provisions of Articles I and III of GATT.
57  In the instant case, the Panel did not 
consider what types of discrimination are covered by the reference to “principles of non-
discriminatory treatment” in Article XVII:1(a).  Nor was the Appellate Body requested to 
address this issue.
58  
  There are different views regarding whether Article III itself is separately 
applicable to STEs (See Davey, 1998). If Article III applies to STE behavior, is every 
violation of the anti-discrimination requirement of Article XVII:1 also a violation of 
Article III?  It appears not.  Article III:4 speaks of “laws, regulations or requirements 
affecting . . . internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.” 
So there may be a loophole for purchase or sale decisions, although it may be possible to 
read this language broadly enough to include STE purchasing requirements.   
On the other hand, Article III:8(a) excludes from coverage government 
procurement for its own use, and by a contrario reasoning seems to leave included in 
other provisions of Article III government procurement and resale for commercial use.
59  
But this argument must encounter an expressio unius argument
60 based on the Ad Note to 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, which specifically states that these articles include 
                                                 
56   It “saw great force in Canada’s argument that only the most-favoured-nation and not the national 
treatment obligations fall within the scope of the general principles referred to in Article XVII:1(a).”  
Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, adopted 7 February 1984, BISD 30S/140, 
163, para. 5.16. 
57   Panel Report on Korea - Various Measures on Beef, para. 753, citing Panel Report on Canada - Import, 
Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, adopted 18 
February 1992, BISD 39S/27 (EC), para. 4.26; Panel Report on Canada - Import, Distribution and Sale of 
Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing Agencies, adopted 18 February 1992, BISD 39S/27 
(US), para. 5.15, stating that “This interpretation was confirmed a contrario by the wording of Article 
III:8(a).” 
58   Appellate Body Report, para. 88.   
59   Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing 
Agencies, L6304, adopted 22 March 1988, 35S/27, 90, para. 4.26.   
60 Expressio unius: expressing or including one thing implies the exclusion of the other.   
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restrictions made effective through STEs.
61  Its failure to include Article III supports an 
argument that Article III does not cover acts of STEs.  However, in Canada—Import, 
Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, the 
1992 Panel found certain STE practices to violate Article III.
62
Furthermore, there may be a question as to whether STE purchase or sale 
decisions are “measures” of the relevant member state.  Is the STE an organ of the 
relevant member state for purposes of responsibility under WTO law, or an independent 
legal entity?  This is an issue of the scope of state responsibility for STEs.  In the context 
of Article XVII, the Panel in the instant case stated that “under Article XVII:1(a), non-
conforming conduct by a Member's STE engages that Member's responsibility under 
international law, even in the absence of intervention of the Member itself, as would be 
necessary under Article XVII:1(c).”
63  But does a violation of Article III by a STE violate 
the member state’s obligations thereunder?  Perhaps it is best to say that if Article III 
governs STE behavior, then the member state has an obligation to ensure compliance.  
This would appear to be the result under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Charter.   
On the other hand, there is some question whether the disciplines of Article XVII 
are subsumed by other provisions of GATT, including Article III.  “It is noteworthy that 
in the past, no GATT or WTO dispute settlement report has established a violation of 
Article XVII.  The claims of GATT-inconsistent discrimination were always decided in 
favour of the complainants directly on the basis of Articles I, III, and XI rather than on 
Article XVII” (Petersmann, 1998). 
64   
 
5.  Commercial Considerations and the Right to Regulate 
The Appellate Body’s holding seems to leave significant policy space in Article 
XVII:1(b).  Member states that use STEs to implement development policy, or industrial 
policy, are protected from the application of the commercial considerations requirement 
                                                 
61  Canada made this argument in Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian 
Provincial Marketing Agencies, L6304, adopted 22 March 1988, 35S/27, 90, para. 4.26 (although it did not 
rule on the Article III claim, the panel “saw great force to” the opposing argument).   
62   Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial Marketing 
Agencies, adopted 18 February 1992, BISD 39S/27, 80-82, paras. 5.17-5.22. 
63   Panel Report, para. 6.43. 
64, Since Petersmann wrote, a panel in Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef, WT/DS161,169/R, Appellate Body Report adopted 2001, found a violation of Article XVII.   
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of Article XVII:1(b), provided that their action is not discriminatory within the meaning 
of Article XVII:1(a).  This was important to a number of WTO Member States.  The 
Appellate Body noted that: 
Canada, Australia, China, and the European Communities all disagree with the United 
States' reasoning.  Essentially, they argue that accepting the United States' view of Article 
XVII:1(b) would force STEs to refrain from using  any  of the special rights or privileges 
that they may enjoy and, thereby, put them at a competitive  disadvantage  as compared 
to private enterprises, which can and do exercise any and all market power they can 
muster.  These participants argue that any such interpretation would be inconsistent with 
the explicit recognition, in Article XVII:1, that Members are entitled to establish and 
maintain STEs and to grant them exclusive or special privileges.
65
 
6.  Discrimination Under Article XVII:1(a) 
Subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1 deals with non-commercial considerations, which 
may or may not be associated with discrimination.   Above, we have discussed the 
relationship between “non-discrimination” under subparagraph (a) and “commercial 
considerations” under subparagraph (b).  This relationship depends, in part, on the 
meaning of “discrimination” in Article XVII:1(a) (discussed below).  On the other hand, 
as suggested above, while not all cases of non-commercial considerations involve 
discrimination, all cases of discrimination (in the WTO sense
66) involve non-commercial 
considerations in the sense of subparagraph (b).  After all, the WTO is concerned with 
discrimination because of the effects of discrimination on competition.  Competition, by 
definition, involves the free play of the kinds of commercial considerations listed in 
subparagraph (b).   
If discrimination requires differential treatment of imported and domestic 
products—as would seem to be suggested by “non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in 
this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private 
traders”—then there will be cases in which subparagraph (a) is narrower than 
subparagraph (b).  That is, there will be cases where the application of non-commercial 
considerations has no international differential or discriminatory intent or impact. We do 
not yet know how future panels, and the Appellate Body, will define discrimination under 
Article XVII:1(a).  The reference in Article XVII:1(a) is to “general principles of non-
                                                 
65   Appellate Body Report, para. 147.   
66   Excluding differential pricing, pursuant to the ad note to Article XVII:1. 
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discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures 
affecting imports or exports by private traders.” 
In connection with Article III jurisprudence of de facto discrimination, a 
significant question arises whether national treatment is violated simply by differential 
treatment of like products, where likeness is determined based largely on a competitive 
relationship, or whether, on the other hand, national treatment is violated where 
regulatory categories appear to have been established with the aim of affecting the 
competitive position of imported products, and with that effect (See Hudec, 1998 and 
Porges & Trachtman, 2003). It may be that Article XVII jurisprudence will need to 
develop a doctrine by which to distinguish between STE measures that have been 
established with a similar aim and effect of discrimination, on the one hand, and STE 
measures that carry out a good faith, albeit non-commercial, industrial policy.   
  Does the Canada Wheat opinion require a different understanding of 
discrimination under Article XVII:1(a) from that which exists under Articles I, III, XIII, 
etc.?  To the extent that there is a difference, it would seem to be inconsistent with the 
express intent of Article XVII:1(a), which respects the principles of nondiscrimination 
reflected in those provisions.  As noted above, there is some question as to which 
principles of non-discrimination are included.   
  To the extent that STEs are used for development-promotion purposes, it may be 
that Article XVII inhibits some of the behaviors that might be desirable.  Does a 
distinction motivated by considerations of economic development policy constitute 
discrimination in the Article XVII:1(a) sense?  The Appellate Body in Canada-Wheat 
specifically referred to its decision in EC-Tariff Preferences, suggesting that 
“discrimination” “can accommodate both drawing distinctions per se, and drawing 
distinctions on an improper basis.”
67  While the Appellate Body was not called upon to 
determine which meaning prevails within Article XVII:1(a), it leaves room for a future 
interpretation that allows for distinctions on a proper development policy or industrial 
policy basis.  Of course, STEs and similar entities that would be subject to Article XVII 
are just one instrument that governments may want to use to pursue development 
objectives. More generally, development policies may be justified under Article XVIII of 
                                                 
67   Appellate Body Report, para. 87.   
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GATT, raising potential questions concerning the consistency of any interpretations of 
Article XVII and Article XVIII and the Enabling Clause.  
 
7.  What Are the Implications for STE-Based Economic Policy? 
The Appellate Body decision in Canada-Wheat, declining to impose a stricter 
requirement on STE behavior beyond non-discrimination, leaves a great deal of 
regulatory freedom for states using STEs as instruments of economic policy.  If the 
Appellate Body had accepted the U.S. argument that Article XVII:1(b) goes beyond 
discrimination to impose a general requirement of commercial behavior (decision-making 
in accordance with commercial considerations), it would have been incumbent upon the 
Appellate Body also to identify some limits to this requirement.  For example, a different 
interpretative approach might have found a requirement of commercial behavior, but 
tempered it by a least trade restrictive alternative test.  This would have been an act of 
construction, as Article XVII does not use language of this type.  But it would have been 
practically necessary in order to allow STEs to be useful from a policy standpoint.   
The Appellate Body decision does not require that STE behavior be commercial, 
or even efficient, but maintains the requirement that STE behavior must be non-
discriminatory—that it not impose adverse effects on other states through discrimination.  
The definition of discrimination may pose some difficulty, but if the focus is on aim and 
effects, application of Article XVII will address the intentional distortions, leaving 
unintentional distortions in place.  This seems a reasonable balance between the right to 
trade and the right to regulate.   
Of course, if the Appellate Body had agreed with the U.S. that there is an 
independent obligation to act solely in accordance with commercial considerations, it 
would have introduced a procrustean requirement that STEs act as though they were not 
STEs.  The Appellate Body would have inappropriately caused the WTO to take sides in 
connection with the choice between different types of organization of the economy of 
member states.
68
  Notwithstanding the resolution of this case, it is not clear that the CWB will 
continue to operate in its current configuration. Some Canadian farm groups are of the 
                                                 
68 See Cottier & Mavroidis, 1998, warning against such intervention. 
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view that abolishing the monopoly marketing and purchasing rights of the CWB would 
be beneficial to them. Forces for reform include the government of Alberta, which has 
commissioned a study on how the monopoly might be phased out. While pressure from 
trading partners may have played a role in focusing attention on the efficiency and equity 
performance of the CWB, more important appears to have been perceptions that the 
performance of the CWB can be improved upon, and the experience of New Zealand and 
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State Trading Enterprises 
 
1.* (a)  Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains 
a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in 
effect, exclusive or special privileges,* such enterprise shall, in its purchases or 
sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the 
general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement 
for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders. 
 
(b)  The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to 
require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of 
this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with 
commercial considerations,* including price, quality, availability, marketability, 
transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the 
enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance 
with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases 
or sales.   
 




  The operations of Marketing Boards, which are established by contracting 
parties and are engaged in purchasing or selling, are subject to the provisions of 
subparagraphs (a) and (b). 
 
  The activities of Marketing Boards which are established by contracting 
parties and which do not purchase or sell but lay down regulations covering 
private trade are governed by the relevant Articles of this Agreement. 
  The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sales of a 
product in different markets is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, 
provided that such different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet 
conditions of supply and demand in export markets. 
 
Paragraph 1 (a) 
  Governmental measures imposed to insure standards of quality and efficiency in 
the operation of external trade, or privileges granted for the exploitation of national 
natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise control over the 
trading activities of the enterprise in question, do not constitute "exclusive or special 
privileges". 
 
  26